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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
SUMNER J. HA'rCH & ROBERT :M.
:McRAE,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.

MARY RENZO and TONY RENZO,

Defenda1its,

and
JESSE GALLO and LENA GALLO
. wife,
'
lns

Case No.
11076

Interpleaded Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF 013' PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS

srrATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
rrhs is an appeal on which respondents defend arising out of a judgment entered by the Honorable Stewart
1\1. Hanson, one of the Judges of the Third Judicial
Court, in and for the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah,
~aid judgment having been entered on October 11, 1967,

2
arising 01Lt of a eonrt ord<>r datl•d May 31, 19G7. In said
order appellants, .frssP Uallo and Lena Gallo as "interpleadPd defenda11ts" \\'!'l'l' rn1uired to appear for the
purpose of having their depositions takPn, (arising out
of tlwir failure to snbmit to depositions previously on
F\·brnary 11, 1967).

HELIEF SOUUHT OK APPEAL
Respondents seek to snstain the ordPr and subsequent judgnwnt of OctobPr 11, 1967.

STATEMENT

O~'

FACTS

Without arguing our pm;ition we will attempt to
confine this statement of facts to the record before this
court rather than impose mental reflections. This action
arises out of the foreclosure of a certain real <::>state
mortgage on property situate in Salt Lake City, Utah.
The subject matter note and mortgage werP reduced
to judgment in the exhibit file as ]<~xhihit 1-P and ]~x
hibit 3-P, respectively.
An action was commenced to foreclose the above
mortgage on August 4, 1966 (R. 8 and 9). Appellants'
counsel filed an answer on behalf of Renzo's, and a complaint in intervention on behalf of appellants. After
service of answer to interrogatories, a notice of the taking of the depositions of the Renzos and the Gallos was
filed on January 27, 1967 (R. :-36) requiring their appearance at the office of respondents on February 11, 1967,
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at :::;ucces::nve times beginning at 9 :00 a.nt. Ap1>dlants
through their counsel filed a motion, presumably under
Hule 30(b), Utah Rnles of Civil Procedun• on Febrnarv
'
.
G, 1967 (R. 37) noticing the same for lwaring on Fehruary 10, 1967, (H. 38) which in substance attempted to
eliminate their required prest>nce for the purpose of
having their depositions taken. rrhey argued that they
had had some interrogatories served upon tlM11, and
tlw,- might suffer loss of pay for employment if they
appeared. This motion was denied.
Thereafter in accordance with the allegations of respondents' motion (R. 39) which motion sets forth the
appearance of the Renzos and the Gallos at rt>spondents'
office on February 11, 1967, and the circumstances of the
Gallos' declining to submit to deposition8! Said motion,
under Rule 37, and other motions were set down for
hearing before the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, District
.JndgP, on March 1, 1967.
At that hearing, the court had before it respondents'
motion to dismiss the Gallos' claims against them in Civil
No. 166824 (R. 6), which motion was heard and granh•d

h.Y written order dated May 31, 1967 (R. 7) because the
claiurn ::;et forth in that civil action could be fully adjudi<'ated in the civil action now on appeal.
He8Jlondents further moved the court pursuant to tlH'
ntk's of civil procedure to publish the deposition of Mary

Henzo for the reasons stated (R. 42) which motion was

support(•d o~· thP affid<l\ it or a .;\otary Puhlic (It 44).
1.1his motion \\·as grankcl hy writkn ordt>r datPd ~lay 31,
19()/ (R 4(i). The last 1110tion heard before Judge '\Vilkins was respondents' motion, undPr Rnle 37, relying
on the statl•nwnts of eonnsPl, F'ebruary 11, 19G7, and the
rdusal of appellants' eolms<>l and ap1J1:.•llanb:i to submit
to havP tht•ir ch•positions taken in the pre::>l'nce of the
othPr partie:s to this action, which motion also alleged
\\·i IJful ,-iolation of tlw ndes of eiYil proeednn•; failure of
t1H• Callos to :sePk a prntectiye order under Hnle 30(b),
Utah Rules of Civil Procednn•, (without admitting tlwir
t·ntitlernent to the ;-;ame) and alleging, becau:se of the
appellants' willful refmml, n•spond(•nh;' right to expenses,
attorney::;' fees and othl'r l'.OSts which woHld be incurred
in rescheduling these depositions at a time when all 1nuties could be present. This motion was also granted
(R. 49) and the Gallos \\'<:>re ordered to appear in the
office of respondents on June 16 1967, at J 0 :00 a.m., and
to, in advance of said hearing, pay the costs and ex1wnses
awarded by the court.
On June 5, 1967, appellants filt\d "motion to va<"at<>
order" (R. 47) attempting to rehash tlw dismissal of
Civil No. 166824, and setting forth an argument of their
theory of the ease and further eontPsted the eonrt's
award of costs and PXJH:nse.s for failure to appt>ar in
attt>ndanee aft0r

notice~

for depositions. This motion was

heard and argued ,J nn(> 14, 1!)()7; denied hy written ord(•J'
dakd Augnst 17, 1967 (H. G5) which order permitted
respondents to n·-1wtice tlw dqJositions of np]>P11ants.
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The new notice of the taking of the ap1wlianb:.;' <ll'lJOsitions scheduled for Octolwr 5, 1967, was filt·d 8epternber 21, 1967, (R. 67) and served notice of the conditions
imposed upon appellants' ap1warance as sd forth in the
.May 31, 1967 order (R. 7).
Thereaftt~r, appellants on October :2, 1967, filed a
"motion to strike the depositions" (R 57) alleging the
Jack of authority of the district court to retit1ire them to
pay costs and expenses; alleging that there had never
been a hearing on their obligation to pay costs and exp('nses; and further arguing their case. This motion was
noticPd for hearing on October 6, 1967, (R. 52).

Respondents filed motions to dismiss appellants'
pleadings under Rule 12, and asked the court to hear the
:-ame on October 6, 1967, and filed an amended notice
of the taking of depositions for October 11, 1967, at 9 :00
a.rn., and requested in other motions filed and heard
on Oetoher 6, 1967, notwithstanding the date which they
WPrt•

noticed for hearing, that the court make otlwr

reasonable adjustments in the expenses inYolved in haYing all parties present at the taking of the depositions
in Yiew of the fact that Mary Renzo defendant, had since
mowd to Redwood City, California, a fad sti1mlatPd
lidwt><>n respondents' and appellants' counsel in open
('()lll't.

(R. 72)

At the hearing on October G, J9G7, the court, in its
order found the claim of appt>llants to lw erroneous (in
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their eontention that no ht•aring had bPen held on the
foes and expenses portion of the l\lay :n, 19G7 order)
( H. 71); that appvllanb ,,,onld bl' n'quin'd to appear for
thl' pmpost' of haYing their dqJositions taken pursuant
to the reqllf'8t of com1sel continuing depositions until that
date a::-; L'vidPnred hy (R. G9); and that as a condition
precedent to their appearing, appellants pay to respondents, the taxed C(rnfo and e.:qwn8es within hn-nty four
11ours of said a1i1waurne<', nr th(·ir plPadings would be
stricken.
The ord<:>r further contai1wd a prov1s10n for the
taxing of fees and expt•nses in returning Mary Renzo to
Salt Lake City, Utah, and back to her home in Redwood
City, California, should her presence be deemed necessary by respondents after commencing the taking of
appellants' depositions.
Upon the failure of appellants to appear on October
11, 1967, and pursuant to court order, upon the affidavit
(R. 75) of one of the respondents to that effect, supported by the transcript of the reporter (Ex. 2-P) and
based on the record of this case, apvellants' pleadings
\\'Pre stricken, the ddanlt of tlw U('11zos Pnten•d in accordanc<~

with the published deposition of Mary Renzo, and

respondents were given a judgment by default against the
Renzos, and the court entned findings in support of its
striking the pleadings of appellants, to wit; their claimed
n1ortgagt• interest was obtained by fraud, and the court
('ntered its judgment of foreclosure accordingly.
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~-,rom the entry of that judgment in favor of resvond-

<,nts, appellants have appealed.

POINT I
'l1H1~ ORDl~R 8TRIKING APPELLANTS'
PLEADINGS \VAS PROPER UNDER THE
CIRCFMS'l'ANCES OF 'l'HIS CASE.

Rule 30(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, concerning protective orders, among other vrovisions states:
" ... that the examination shall be heard with no
one else present except the parties to the action
and their officers or counsel. ... "

It is basic law to entitle a party to have all other parties
iiresent when depositions are being taken. See Barron
& Holtzoff, Wright Ed. Federal Practice & Procedure,
r al. 2A, Section 715.1, at page 246 (discussing Rule
30 (b) :
"As the rule clearly implies, a party, or the
officer of a corporate party, cannot be excluded
from the taking of the deposition."
Respondents do not wish to impose on this court, the
foregoing as an unequivocable statement of the law,
recognizing that occasions may exist \Yhen, after proper
i:ihowing in advance of a deposition or after terminating
1md0r Rule 30(d), a court might make snch an order;

howewr the record in this case is void of such evidence,
and as is clearly indicated by the transcript of the pro-

ceedings of .F'ebrnary 11, HHi7, whl'l'(•in apiwllanh;' counsel refused to havP his clients submit to having their
depositions taken, such refusal "·as 1wi ther in accordance
with tlw rnl<•s of in·oe<>dnn• 11or within tlw laws of this
state.
Our rules of procedurP are reasonahl:· knient with

persons declining discon'r:-. R<>spondt'nts sought and
received in successive orders tht' lWnnissible sanctions
which a trial judge could impose starting from the lowest
to the most extreme and at all tirnPs, as is Pvid<mced l>y
the statt•11wnt of facts in this ea:,.w, ·were delayed at the
last minut{~ by 8lllH'I-flnous and n•pPtitin• motions. The
first sanction imposed hy the court was the pay1nPnt of
costs and expt>nses ( ~ef~ Rule 37 (a)) for the wi llfnl ref nsal to submit to the taking of their deposition::;. The
second sought and obtaint'd sanction, upon their next
refusal to aprwar, was tlit· striking of tlwir pleadings
and appropriate judgment in a<'cordance with the file8
and record as it then appear<--d. ( SPP Hnle 37 (h) and ( d))
The statement of faets in this casl' as wt>ll as tlw record
adequately slwws that the appellants at no time intPnded
to pennit their depositions to he taken and the lower
conrt acted in accordance with the latitude bestowed upon
it i11 Rasln.try v. Baimon, 15 Utah 2d 62, 387 P2d. 239,
rn entering the sanctions and orders of May 31, 1967,

et

Sf~q.

Tucker Bealty Compa11y Inc., i·.
Nwiley, 16 Utah 2d. 97, 39(i P2d. 410, this eonrt said, at
Utal1, pag-e 100:
As aptly stated jn

"E xcep.
·t m
.

ver~' aggravated ca~es less .ser1ous sanct10ns, (the granting of defanlt judgment)
undoubtedly could be applied to' accomplish the
desirPd result, particularly where tlwte is any
likelihood of injustice by depriving a party of a
meritorious cause of action or defense. ·whether
the failure to comply with the court's order has
ht>en wilful and whether the circumstances are so
aggravated as to justify the action taken is. primarily for the trial court to determine." See Bitrton v. Zion's Cooperative Mrrcantile Institiition,
122 Utah 3GO, 249 P. 2d 541; Charlton i:. Hackett,
11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P.2d 17(i.
•

•

,

.

,

'

.

I

'I'

rrliis record adl'quatt>ly supports tlw numerol'ts attempts of respondents' to take appellants' depositions
nnd(~r tlw circumstances to which they are entitled under
th(' rules of civil procedure, and further, emphatica1ly
~'hows appellants' total lack of wilingness to abide hy
those Rules.

The numerous motions "to reconsider" are in violation of the theory of Drnry v. Limceford, 18 Utah 2d 74,
J.15 P.2cl (i()2, wliPn' snc]1 delay tactics are violation of
tlw d(•eisions of this Court and its rnles of procednre.
CONCLUSIONS
Point [ of appellants' brief bt'ing moot beeause of
il1l' order of dismissal ·with pr0;judice dated 1\[ay 31,
1%7, a11d no appeal having heen taken tlwrdrorn, is not
dist·nssed.

rt1lw Tt'lllaining points in appt•llants' hrief han:' been
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adequately coven•d by the statPrnent of facts and rPf PrencP to the recent cases of this conrt. RespondPnh; n•spectfully submit tlte judguwnt order of the lower court,
has<>d on the previous orders of the lowf'r court, is corrc>ct as a matfrr of law: and reqrn·st this eonrt sustain
the judgment on file herein and remand tltis case with
orders to proceed with th<> ordPr of sale, taxing costs in
favor of respondents.
R0sp0ctfu1ly submitted,

HATCH & McRAE
By RobPrt M. McRae

